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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUrION 780 (1992)

I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Throughout modern history, there have only been three internationally estab-

lished commissions to investigate war crimes and prepare for eventual prosecutions before international and national judicial bodies: the 1919 Commission on
the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties

for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War (1919 Commission),' the 1943
United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), and the Commission of Ex-

perts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia (Com-

mission of Experts).2 Even though there are no connections among the three
bodies, there is enough historical precedential value in the first two as the antecedents of the Commission of Experts to warrant a brief examination.3
The 1919 Commission

After World War I, the Preliminary Peace Conference established the 1919
Commission while it was preparing the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and

Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles).4 Each of the five great
powers (the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States) named a
member to the 1919 Commission and five other members were elected from

among other powers having a special interest in the matter.5 The 1919 Commis-

sion was to investigate the responsibility of those who violated the laws and customs of war essentially as embodied in the 1907 Hague Convention,6 as well as

'See REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRELIMINARY PEACE CONFERENCE BY THE COMMISSION ON THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORS OF WAR AND ON ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES (Carnegie Endow-

ment for International Peace, Division of International Law Pamphlet No. 32, 1919), reprinted in 14
AJIL 95 (1920) [hereinafter 1919 COMMISSION REPORT].

2 SC Res. 780 (Oct. 6, 1992), reprinted in 31 ILM 1476 (1992).
3 There is no reason to believe that the Security Council had these two antecedents in mind when it
established the Commission of Experts.
'Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, 11
Martens (ser. 3) 323, 2 Bevans 43.

THE TREATIES OF PEACE, 1919-1923, at 3 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1924).
6 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1
Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention]. The 1919 Commission's responsibility was to
investigate the following:

1. The responsibility of the authors of war.

2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the
German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.

3. The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the
enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly
placed.
784
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what the Commission considered to be crimes against the "laws of humanity."7
These words appear in the Preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention and are
commonly known as the Martens Clause.8 The 1919 Commission, like the 1992

Commission of Experts, was to present evidence of criminality to an international
criminal tribunal that in this case was to prosecute German military personnel for

war crimes.9
Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles provided that "the German government
recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated powers to bring before military

tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and

customs of war." Furthermore, Article 229 provided for the Allies' right to establish national war crimes tribunals to try alleged German war criminals and Article

230 required the full cooperation and legal assistance of Germany in those proceedings.
In addition to providing for a judicial body to prosecute war criminals, Article

227 of the Treaty of Versailles established the responsibility of Kaiser Wilhelm II
for the "supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties," for which the Kaiser was to be prosecuted separately from the other war
criminals. However, the Kaiser sought refuge in the Netherlands, which considered him nonextraditable on the grounds that the offense charged in the Treaty
was essentially a "political offense," as it was within the prerogative of national

sovereignty for a head of state to decide to go to war.'0 The Allies did not try to
secure his surrender.

4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences.
5. Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the
enquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.
1919 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, 14 AJIL at 95. See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 148 (1992).

7 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, Preamble. Because the United States and Japan objected to the concept of international criminal responsibility for violations of the "laws of humanity,"
this basis for international criminal responsibility was not pursued. 1919 COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 1, 14 AJIL at 144-50; Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the

United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, Ann. II (Apr. 4, 1919), reprinted
in 14 AJIL at 127. In 1919 the eventual prosecutions for crimes against humanity related to conduct

by Turkish officials against the Armenian and Greek minorities in 1915-1919. Article 230 of the
Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, Aug. 10, 1920, reprinted in 2 THE
TREATIES OF PEACE, supra note 5, at 789, 15 AJIL 179 (Supp. 1921), required Turkey to surrender
such accused persons for trial. However, this treaty was never ratified and the surrender of the
accused never occurred. Instead, the treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, July 24,
1923, reprinted in 2 THE TREATIES OF PEACE, supra, at 959, 18 AJIL 1 (Supp. 1924), which did not
contain a provision similar to Article 230 of the unratified treaty but was accompanied by a "Declaration of Amnesty" for all offenses committed between August 1, 1914, and November 20, 1922. See M.

Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (1991).

8 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 6, preambular para. 6.

' One of the differences between the two bodies is that the 1919 Commission was established
contemporaneously with the drafting of the Treaty of Versailles, which provided for an international

tribunal, while the 1992 Commission of Experts was established some six months before the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See SC Res. 827 (May 25,
1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1203 (1993).

'0 See Quincy Wright, The Legality of the Kaiser, 8 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 121 (1919). The Kaiser live
in retirement until his natural death.
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The 1919 Commission investigated cases and incidents involving over twenty
thousand persons and contemplated the prosecution of some twelve thousand

that it believed might have committed war crimes. But when the Allies' political
will for international as well as national prosecutions in their own countries
eroded, the plans for an international tribunal or national war crimes tribunals set
up by the Allies were abandoned in favor of token national prosecutions in Germany. Thus, two years after conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies,
essentially for political reasons, decided not to establish a war crimes tribunal
pursuant to Articles 227, 228 and 229. Instead, the Allies deferred to Germany
for the prosecution of a limited number of German violators.11 The 1919 Commission's final list of persons to be prosecuted was reduced to 896 accused. How-

ever, Germany's reluctance to prosecute a large number of its own military and
the dwindling resolve of some of the Allies brought the list of 896 down to 45
persons who were to be tried before the Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of
Justice sitting in Leipzig.12
In December 1919, Germany's parliament had passed a special law to carry out
the provisions of Articles 227, 228, and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles. But when
the plans for an international tribunal and Allied national war crimes tribunals
were abandoned in favor of German prosecutions, two public acts were promulgated, in March 1920 and May 1921, respectively, to give the Imperial Court of
Justice special jurisdiction to conduct national trials of cases referred to the court
by the Allies.13 Since the Prosecutor General of the Imperial Court of Justice had
the ultimate authority to initiate prosecutions, the forty-five cases presented by

the Allies were further reduced to twelve that were actually tried.14 Of the twelve
cases, six resulted in acquittals.15
Although the armistice had been signed on November 11, 1918, the trials at
Leipzig did not begin until May 23, 1921.16 During the three-year interim, world

public opinion changed and the interest in prosecutions subsided.17 Additionally,
German public opinion supported the accused officers and soldiers.18 In fact, the
German people reacted with "indignation that German judges could be found to
sentence the war criminals and the Press brought all possible pressure to bear on
the court."19 Consequently, the Allies decided after all to prosecute accused war

criminals in national trials according to Article 229 of the Treaty of Versailles.20
However, the Allies did not extradite any of the accused Germans, with the ex-

ception of Belgium,21 and France was the only Allied country to conduct in absentia trials.22

Although the Leipzig Trials were a failure, they nonetheless serve as an important historical precedent for war crimes trials. Moreover, the Leipzig Trials

" See generally CLAUDE MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS 23-24 (1921); JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE
TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD

WAR (1982); James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders against the Laws and Customs of War
AJIL 70 (1920).

12 See MULLINS, supra note 1 1, at 26-27. 13 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 201 n.41.
" See MULLINS, supra note 1 1, at 35-36. 1' See BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 201.

6 Id. at 202. '7 Id.

18 Id.

'9 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 51-52 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF
UNWCC].

20 BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 202. 21 Id.
22 Id.
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helped establish a principle: "to put on record before history that might is not
right, and that men whose sole conception of the duty they owe to their country is
to inflict torture upon others, may be put on their trial."23
Europe was tired and drained from the war and wanted peace. Most politicians

felt that the war should be consigned to history and its effects not linger. Prosecutions would be contrary to such an approach. Political leaders deemed justice for
the victims and the advancement of international justice, which was advocated by

many, to be deleterious to political realism.24 Thus, impunity triumphed de facto
over the earlier resolve of the Allies to have an uncompromising and uncompro-

mised international justice system function independently of political considerations. That missed opportunity, however, haunted the world after World War

."25 Indeed, compromised justice always haunts succeeding generations.
The 1943 United Nations War Crimes Commission
The United Nations War Crimes Commission was established during World
War II by a diplomatic conference held at the Foreign Office in London.26 The
term "United Nations" referred to the Allies, since the United Nations Organiza-

tion had not been established at that time. The UNWCC functioned by authority of

the governments of the Allied powers, which established it as a consequence of
the declaration signed in St. James Palace on January 13, 1942.27 The Moscow
Declaration of October 30, 1943, affirmed the St. James Declaration, which reflected the Allies' intention to prosecute war criminals.28 Both declarations called
for the prosecution and punishment of those responsible for the "atrocities conducted during the war."29
The UNWCC produced valuable legal research, provided advice to governments
on how to set up and conduct international and national prosecutions, and served
as a clearinghouse for information submitted by governments. The UNWCC received "dossiers" from different governments and, when satisfied with the suffi-

ciency of their contents, recommended that the persons in question be prose-

cuted.30 It also communicated the "dossiers" to certain governments for eventual

23 MULLINS, supra note 11, at 231. See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 202.
24 See, e.g., WILLIS, supra note 11.
25 This is evidenced by the difficulties in setting up the post-World War II prosecutions. See, e.g.,

ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS (1949) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT].

26 See generally HISTORY OF UNWCC, supra note 19.
27 Inter-Allied Declaration, Jan. 13, 1942, reprinted in PUNISHMENT FOR WAR CRIMES: THE INTERALLIED DECLARATION SIGNED AT ST. JAMES PALACE, LONDON ON 13 JANUARY 1942, AND RELATED
DOCUMENTS (United Nations, New York, undated).

28 Declaration on Security, 9 DEP'T ST. BULL. 308 (1943), reprinted in 38 AJIL 5 (1944). President

Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin signed the statement on October 30, 1943.
29 1943 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 448. In 1943 the major Allied powers in Europe were England, France, the United States and the USSR, but several other powers were also
deemed Allied. Ultimately, 19 of them acceded to the London Charter of August 8, 1945, which was
one of the bases for the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 UNTS 279 [hereinafter London Agreement].
30 The UNWCC examined 8,178 "dossiers," which listed 24,453 accused, 9,520 suspects and 2,556

material witnesses. HISTORY OF UNWCC, supra note 19, at 508-09. By 1948, European countries and
the United States brought a total of 969 cases in their respective courts. The 969 cases involved 3,470
accused, of whom 952 were sentenced to death, 1,905 were imprisoned and 613 were acquitted of all
charges. Id. at 518.
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prosecutions. But the work of the UNWCC was not relied upon in the prosecutions
carried out before the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution of the

Major War Criminals of the Axis (IMT).31 That prosecution was essentially a
United States-led operation headed by Justice Robert Jackson, who set up his own

investigation supported by the U.S. occupation forces in Germany.32
Justice Jackson's investigative operations also supplied information and support
to the other three Allies: France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
However, each of these countries essentially conducted its own investigations,
though the United Kingdom and France made some use of UNWCC material.
Understandably, however, since most of the UNWCC's material originally came

from governments, its "dossiers" did not always have anything to add to what had

been submitted, even though the UNWCC had a committee to carry out "investi-

gations." After the IMT proceedings, the four major Allied powers conducted
"Subsequent Proceedings" in their respective zones of occupation in Germany
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.33 Other proceedings also took place

before national tribunals.34 But the work of the UNWCC, although meritorious,
was not heavily relied upon in the "Subsequent Proceedings" for the reasons
stated above.35

The work of the UNWCC was particularly relevant to the various treaties of
peace concluded between the Allies and the separate Axis powers, which contained provisions concerning prosecutions of war criminals. One example, which
serves as an illustration of the blatant disregard of the UNWCC's work, concerned
Italy.36 The UNWCC found that 1,286 accused Italian war criminals should be
prosecuted by the Allies pursuant to Italy's treaty of surrender.37 After the Allies
withdrew from Italy, the UNWCC expected the Italian Government to carry out

the prosecutions. The UNWCC had extensive documentation on crimes committed
by the Italians in Ethiopia in 1936, in Libya during the war, and also during Italy's
war with and partial occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. The evidence pre-

3X See generally TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRI-

BUNAL (1949).

32 See JACKSON REPORT, supra note 25. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992).

33 Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY, OFFICIAL
GAZETrE No. 3, Jan. 31, 1946, at 50, reprinted in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-

NAL COURT, A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 488 (1980). For U.S. proceedings, see FRANK M.
BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-1955 (1989); TELFORD TAYLOR,
FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUJRNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949).

34 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 213; JEAN PIERRE MAUNOIR, LA REPRESSION DES CRIMES DE
GUERRE DEVANT LES TRIBUNAUX FRAN4.AIS ET ALLIES (1956); HENRI MEYROWITZ, LA REPRESSION PAR

LES TRIBUNAUX ALLEMANDS DES CRIMES CONTRE L'HUMANITE ET DE L'APPARTENANCE A UNE ORGANISA-

TION CRIMINELLE (1960); Willard B. Cowles, Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg), 42 AJIL 299

(1948).
35 An estimated 16,000 persons were prosecuted at the "Subsequent Proceedings" by the four
major Allies that occupied Germany, each one setting up its own proceedings with different substan-

tive laws and procedures for each court. See Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition,

in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 29 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987).
36 The Treaty of Peace with Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 4 Bevans 311, 61 Stat. 1245, provides in Article 45
that Italy has a duty to extradite any of its nationals charged with war crimes. Ethiopia, Greece and

Yugoslavia repeatedly requested the extradition of war criminals, but were refused first by the United
States and the United Kingdom as occupying forces in Italy, and then in 1946 by the Italian Government. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at 227-28.
37 See HISTORY OF UNWCC, supra note 19, at 511.
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sented by these respective Governments through the UNWCC was ignored, both
by the Allies between 1944 and 1946 and by the Italian Government thereafter.
Therefore, no extradition or prosecution ever ensued. The reasons for this situation were essentially political.

The Results of the Earlier Commissions
The 1919 Commission conducted a significant number of investigations and the
1943 UNWCC produced a great deal of evidence and information. The evidence
and information accumulated by these two bodies were to be used in connection
with international prosecutions and also national prosecutions. But this result did
not obtain. It should be emphasized that, when the establishing powers originally
set up these investigatory bodies, it was with the intention that they should produce evidence for prosecutions to take place before international and national
tribunals. It was neither the paucity nor the inadequacy of evidence which precluded that result but, rather, the change in political will of the powers that had

set up these institutions. After World War I, the major European Allies and the
United States did not wish to antagonize Germany and its people any further. As
to the aftermath of World War II, the Nuremberg IMT was the focus of attention.
The United States dominated these proceedings but made no use of the UNWCC;
nor did the four major Allies in the "Subsequent Proceedings" pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10. After the IMT proceedings, the USSR, England and
France went their separate ways for their own reasons. Other national proceedings did not utilize the work of the UNWCC, which was effectively terminated in

1947, as it had never enjoyed enough international political support for its work.

II. THE 1992 COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

The 1992 Commission of Experts was not the first investigative commission
related to the region of the former Yugoslavia. Early in the twentieth century, the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace established a commission of international personalities to investigate alleged atrocities committed against prisoners of
war and civilians during the First Balkan War of 1912 and the Second Balkan War
of 1913.38 At the start of the Second Balkan War, the Commission investigated the
conflict and the conduct of those involved in order to give the western world a
"clear and reliable picture of what was going on in the affected region."39 After
overcoming considerable political and practical obstacles in the region, the Balkan
Commission conducted several fact-finding missions and eventually produced a
substantial report based on their findings. The reported atrocities of 1912 and
1913 bear a haunting resemblance to those which were committed between 1991
and 1994.4?

38 THE OTHER BALKAN WARS 6 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993) [hereinafter
BALKAN WARS]. The Carnegie Endowment appointed seven members to the Commission from the
following countries: the United States, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia (one from each),
and France (two). Id. All of the members were prominent figures in the international peace movement
at the time. Id.

39 Id.

40 A comparison of the Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, reprinted in BALKAN WARS, supra note 38, and the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc.
S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter Final Report], reveals uncanny similarities in the processes
of victimization in that region.
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Mandate and Links to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia

The Commission of Experts, unlike its historical antecedents described above,
received its mandate from what appeared to be a unified Security Council. Thus,

its legal and moral authority was unprecedented. Its broad and comprehensive
mandate fully encompassed all of the violations that occurred in the conflict in the

former Yugoslavia. No time limit was established for its work and expectations of

justice by world public opinion were high. The Security Council authorized the

establishment of the Commission of Experts in Resolution 780 of October 6,
1992, which defined its mandate by stating that the Council:

2. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an
impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyse the information
submitted pursuant to resolution 771 (1992) and the present resolution,
together with such further information as the Commission of Experts may
obtain through its own investigations or efforts, of other persons or bodies

pursuant to resolution 771 (1992), with a view to providing the SecretaryGeneral with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law commit-

ted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.4"
Previously, on August 13, 1992, the Security Council had adopted Resolution

771, which set the stage for establishing the Commission of Experts in Resolution
780. Resolution 771 required member states to submit reports on violations of
international humanitarian law, but other than some of the parties to the conflict,

only the United States submitted a report. While the Commission of Experts was
not originally set up in October 1992 with the specific view that it would be the

first step in the establishment of an ad hoc war crimes tribunal, that prospect was

nonetheless contemplated by several members of the Security Council.42 Indeed,
the subsequent stages in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal

for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY) revealed the nexus between the Commission
and the Tribunal, though no formal institutional links were developed.
In view of this lack of a formal connection, there were some early doubts as to

whether the mandate of the Commission of Experts was to gather "evidence," as
that word is understood in criminal prosecutions, or whether the term "evidence"
in its mandate was only meant to be demonstrative of the type of violations that
occurred in the context of the conflict. Since a tribunal had not yet been estab-

' SC Res. 780 (1992), supra note 2, operative para. 2. The Secretary-General appointed five
members on October 25, 1992: Professor Frits Kalshoven (the Netherlands) as chairman; Professor
M. Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt); Commander William J. Fenrick (Canada); Judge Keba M'Baye (Senegal);
and Professor Torkel Opsahl (Norway). Professor Kalshoven resigned from the Commission for medical reasons in August 1993, and Professor Opsahl, who was briefly the acting chairman, passed away

in September. Therefore, on October 19, 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Professor Bassiouni
as chairman and Professor Christine Cleiren (the Netherlands) and Judge Hanne Sophie Greve (Norway) as new members. Even though he is a naturalized U.S. citizen, Professor Bassiouni, a native-born
Egyptian, was listed as being from "Egypt," because it was felt that no representative of the permanent members of the Security Council should be on the Commission.

42 The United States introduced Security Council Resolution 780, as well as its predecessor Resolution 771. The United States wanted the Commission called "'War Crimes Commission" or to have the
words "war crimes" as part of the name, which would have been reminiscent of the 1943 UNWCC and
the Nuremberg proceedings. The U.S. position was based on its expectation that the Commission

would pave the way for an eventual tribunal, but largely because of the opposition of the United
Kingdom, a compromise on the name "Commission of Experts" was reached in the Security Council.
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lished, it was assumed by some that the latter was the case. Whether the Commis-

sion should or could have focused its efforts on securing prosecution-oriented
criminal evidence from its inception depended not only on the existence of a

tribunal and its eventual rules of evidence, but also on the availability of adequate

resources, which at the time were insufficient for such purposes.43 However, once
the ICTFY was established in May 1993, the Commission of Experts sought to

focus its work on the pursuit of prosecution-oriented evidence. Thus, it rein-

forced its links with the Tribunal. This effort was continued until the Commission
terminated its activities.
On February 22, 1993, following the submission of the Commission's (first)

Interim Report,44 the Security Council took the first step in establishing an ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Resolution 808 (1993)
provided that the Security Council "[d]ecides that an international criminal tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the

former Yugoslavia since 1991.'"4' The Council cited three proposals drafted in
anticipation of the establishment of such a tribunal.46 It also referred to the
conclusion of the Commission's (first) Interim Report that the establishment of an
ad hoc international tribunal would be "consistent with the direction of its

work."47 Whether the Security Council merely cited the Commission's anticipation that an international tribunal would be set up for support, or whether it was
also convinced by the contents of the (first) Interim Report that such a tribunal

was needed, is not known. However, there is no doubt that France took the lead

in the initiative,48 strongly supported by the United States. Italy's contribution
was also very useful.49 Moreover, having sent three investigative missions to
the former Yugoslavia, the CSCE was both supportive and influential in the
outcome.50

Pursuant to Resolution 808 (1993), the Secretary-General submitted a report

*to the Security Council on May 3, 1993,51 containing a proposed statute of the
international tribunal. It is a comprehensive text clearly written and easy to un-

derstand, consisting of thirty-four articles with accompanying commentary on

See "Resources of the Commission," infra p. 801.

4Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-

tion 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/25274, at 20, para. 74 (Feb. 10, 1993) [hereinafter First Interim Report].

" SC Res. 808 (Feb. 22, 1993). See generally Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in
Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 122.

" The proposals considered were submitted by the Committee of French Jurists, a commission of
Italian jurists and the Permanent Representative of Sweden on behalf of the Conference on Security

and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). See UN Docs. S/25266, S/25300 and S/25307, respectively
(1993). All three proposals relied, in part, on M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, DRAFT STATUTE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL (Nouvelles Etudes Penales No. 9, 1992).
47 First Interim Report, supra note 44. 4 See UN Doc. S/25266 (1993).
4 See UN Doc. S/25300 (1993).

5 See UN Doc. S/25307 (1993). The drafting of the statute involved significant consultations with
governments, nongovernmental organizations and individual experts. The work was under the supervision of Carl-August Fleischhauer, then Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel of the United
Nations and now a judge of the International Court of Justice, and Ralph Zacklin, Deputy Legal
Counsel of the United Nations.

" Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808

(1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1159 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].
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each article.52 On May 25, 1993, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolu-

tion 827, which established an international tribunal "for the sole purpose of
prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitar-

ian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia," and adopted the SecretaryGeneral's proposed statute without amendment.53 Under the terms of the tenth

preambular paragraph of Resolution 827, the Commission of Experts was asked
to continue its work "on an urgent basis," pending the appointment of a prosecu-

tor. Thus, Resolutions 808 and 827 clearly establish the connection between the
Commission and the Tribunal in that Resolution 808 refers to the Commission's
recommendation that a tribunal be established as a logical extension of its work,

and Resolution 827 refers to the continuation of the Commission's work presumably as the basis for the Prosecutor's forthcoming activities.

Owing, however, to political difficulties in appointing a prosecutor, which
lasted until July 1994, the relationship between the two organs was necessarily

unpredictable. The first Prosecutor was appointed by the Security Council in

October 1993, but he never took office and notified the Secretary-General of his
resignation on January 17, 1994.54 Meanwhile, believing that the Prosecutor
would take office in February 1994, Carl-August Fleischhauer, then United Na-

tions Legal Counsel, notified the Commission on December 13, 1993, that its

work should end on April 30, 1994.55 On July 8, 1994, the Secretary-General
nominated another Prosecutor to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of the

first appointee.5' Between January 17 and August 15, 1994, there was no prose
tor in office. Therefore, the termination of the Commission without a prosecutor

in office was not within the spirit of Resolution 827, which was to establish continuity between the two organs.

Nevertheless, at the appointed date for the completion of its work, April 30, the
Commission turned over its data base and all of its documents and materials to the

Office of the Prosecutor, which started its work on the basis of the Commission's
material and used some of the personnel that had been associated with the

Commission. Thus, the passage from the Commission to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY was promptly effectuated, though without a gradually phased
transition.

57

52 The Commission of Experts contributed to the Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 51,
with respect to the formulation of the applicable law consistent with its statements in its First Interim
Report, supra note 44.

5 SC Res. 827, supra note 9. Several governments had wanted to introduce amendments to the
proposed statute, but it was feared that such a process would only delay its adoption. Therefore, no
amendments were allowed, though the resolution itself contained a few substantive additions.

54The Secretary-General, under Article 16(4) of the Tribunal's statute, has the prerogative of
nominating candidates for the Council's appointment. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note

51, at 42. He formally nominated M. Cherif Bassiouni in August 1993. The Council had decided to
act on the nomination by consensus instead of by vote. This first nominee did not, however, obtain the
consensus of the Council's members. In July 1994, the Secretary-General appointed Justice Richard

Goldstone of the Supreme Court of South Africa and the Security Council unanimously accepted the
appointment. See text at and note 56 infra. Justice Goldstone took office on August 15, 1994.
5 No decision had been taken by the Security Council as of the date of Mr. Fleischhauer's letter to
terminate the Commission, which the Council itself had created.

56 See supra note 54.
57 See "Termination of the Commission," infra p. 802.
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Applicable Law

In its (first) Interim Report, the Commission addressed various questions pertaining to the applicable law. Such questions were particularly relevant to the
Commission's determination of what to focus on in its investigations of evidence

of "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law."58
The Commission articulated its views on certain legal questions, concluding that
for its purposes it would consider the conflict as a "conflict of an international
character," and therefore subject to the international law of armed conflict.59 The
international law of armed conflict consists of the relevant rules of customary
international law contained in the 1907 Hague Convention on the Regulation of

the Laws and Customs of War on Land60 and the codification contained in the

1949 Geneva Conventions6" and the 1977 Additional Protocols.62 In addition, the
Commission concluded that the following also applied: the 1948 Convention on

the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;63 the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-

flict;64 and "crimes against humanity," as established in conventional and customary international law.65

The Commission consistently held the view that, irrespective of whether all or
part of the conflict over all or part of the territory would be deemed a conflict of
an international or a noninternational character, there were sufficient interna-

tional legal norms applicable to all of the violations that were committed. Further-

more, the Commission held that genocide and "crimes against humanity" were
proscriptive norms of jus cogens, which applied at all times and places regardless
of the parties to the conflict or its characterization. The Commission also consistently took the view that, pursuant to its mandate, it would not consider any legal
issues pertaining to the parties' claims regarding the legitimacy of the use of force.

In short, the Commission did not deal with claims of "aggression" and "self-

defense," but only with conduct in connection with the jus in bello and other
violations of international humanitarian law in the course of the armed conflict
irrespective of its characterization.
58 SC Res. 780, supra note 2, operative para. 1.
5 First Interim Report, supra note 44, at 13-14, paras. 37-45. For a recent survey of legal issues,
see Jordan Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to the Events in the Former Yugoslavia,

9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499 (1994).

601907 Hague Convention, supra note 6.
61 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Fo
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3114, 75 UNTS 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-

tion of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST

3217, 75 UNTS 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST
3316, 75 UNTS 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287.

62 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977,
1125 UNTS 3, reprinted in 16 ILM 1391 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts

(Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 606, 16 ILM at 1442.
3 Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277. 64 May 14, 1954, 249 UNTS 240.
65 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6(c), annexed to the London Agreement,
supra note 29; International Law Commission, Report on Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, UN
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, UN Doc. A/1316 (1950); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 6, at
479-99.
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It should be noted that after the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina considered
themselves to be successor states to the former Yugoslavia, which had ratified the

1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, and that they were
therefore bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.66 Furthermore, Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina explicitly declared themselves bound by both
the Conventions and the Protocols.67

Other formulations of applicable law are found in the (first) Interim Report

(paras. 47-54). In its Final Report, the Commission noted with satisfaction that
many of its legal formulations had found their way into the statute of the ICTFY

concerning the applicable law.68 However, the Commission took it upon itself to
clarify certain legal issues in the Final Report, so as to demonstrate the legal bases
on which it had relied in its work. It thus explained its understanding of "geno-

cide, '69 "crimes against humanity,"70 "command responsibility,'"71 "superior
orders,"72 "reprisals,"73 and "rape and other forms of sexual assault,"74 as related
to the facts it had examined and reported. The Commission also emphasized its
understanding that Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions apply, even

though the statute of the ICTFY does not specifically refer to them.75

Interestingly, both the 1919 Commission and the 1943 UNWCC also dealt with
questions of applicable law in their earlier sessions, as well as in their final reports.

Because it was more investigation oriented and composed primarily of military
personnel, the 1919 Commission was less concerned about questions of law than

the 1943 UNWCC, which had more jurists and diplomats as members and staff.
Both, however, contributed to the advancement of international humanitarian

law. Without the 1919 Commission's efforts to articulate the concept of "crimes
against the laws of humanity," "crimes against humanity," as defined in Article

6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, would not have been easily charged and prose-

cuted after World War I1.76 Similarly, it is hoped that the work of the Commissi
of Experts on the applicable law will contribute to the jurisprudence of the ICTFY
and to future legal developments in international criminal law.

The Work of the Commission of Experts
The Commission of Experts worked on three tracks: (1) developing a data base
for information and evidence received and its analysis; (2) conducting on-site

""First Interim Report, supra note 44, at 13, para. 38.
"i Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, respectively, signed separate declarations with the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The three countries succeeded to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols on the following dates: Slovenia, March 26, 1992; Croatia, May 11, 1992; and Bosnia-Hercegovina, December 31, 1992. See First Interim Report, supra note
44, at 13, para. 38; Final Report, supra note 40, at 32, para. 125.

(;8 Final Report, supra note 40, at 16, 18, paras. 56, 62.

""Id. at 24-27, paras. 87-101. 7" Id. at 20-24, paras. 72-86.
7' Id. at 16-17, paras. 55-60. 7' Id. at 18, paras. 61-62.
7 Id. at 18-19, paras. 63-66.

74 Id. at 27-29, paras. 102-09. See also Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime under International
Humanitarian Law, 87 AJIL 424 (1993).
See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 51.

7" M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31
LUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994).
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investigations; and (3) relying on certain governments to conduct investigations
on its behalf. Notwithstanding limited resources and personnel, discussed below,
and the early difficulties encountered by the Commission, some of which were
simply due to the novelty of the enterprise, its record of accomplishment is noteworthy. In less than eight months, from July 1993 to March 1994, the Commis-

sion undertook thirty-five field missions,77 conducted several extensive investigations, gathered a large amount of evidence and information, and produced sev-

eral major reports78-all of which constitutes a starting point for the Prosecutor
of the ICTFY.

At its second session, held in Geneva in December 1992, the Commission formally elected two rapporteurs to be principally responsible for the first two investigative techniques. M. Cherif Bassiouni was elected Rapporteur for the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts and William J. Fenrick was elected Rapporteur for

On-Site Investigations. The chairman of the Commission was responsible for follow-up with governments on specific matters. In October 1993, at the Commis-

sion's eighth session, other members were asked to fulfill certain specific tasks:

Judge Keba M'Baye was to be Rapporteur for the Destruction of Cultural Property; Judge Hanne Sophie Greve was to be Rapporteur on the Prijedor Area; and
Professor Christine Cleiren was to prepare a special report on the legal aspects of
rape and sexual assault.

Gathering and analysis of the facts. The Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts established a data base at DePaul University's International Hu-

man Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), which relied on an average of thirty-two lawyers and law students, in the course of time, to input the data and prepare analy-

ses and reports on different topics. By the time the data base was transferred to
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY, on April 30, 1994, it had received

sixty-four thousand pages of documents79 submitted by governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations and other sources.
In addition, a special library of video tapes was established, containing over

three hundred hours of tape. These tapes were produced by different public and
private television networks in several countries, including those from the "warring

factions" and private sources. The archive of video tapes was set up mostly
through the voluntary contribution of Linden Productions of Los Angeles, California, which also translated tapes in foreign languages and prepared written

transcripts with technology that permits the juxtaposition of printed images and

corresponding text.80
The reports produced by the legal analysts of IHRLI, which are annexes to the

Commission's Final Report, are on the following subjects: "The Military Structure

of the Warring Factions, "8' "Special Forces,"82 "Ethnic Cleansing,"83 "The Battle

Final Report, supra note 40, at 10, paras. 23-24.

78 The Annexes to the Final Report are expected to be over 3,000 pages long.
7 To keep track of the 64,000 pages of documents, an elaborate system was established for recording the documents as they were received.

80 In addition to being a visual record, the archive of video tapes also helps witnesses identify places
and persons, including perpetrators. The Office of the Prosecutor is exploring the use of this technology, provided by IHRLI and Linden Productions.

81 Final Report, supra note 40, at 29-33, paras. 110-28.
82 Id. 83 Id. at 33-37, paras. 129-50.
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and Siege of Sarajevo,"84 "Detention Facilities,"85 "Rape and Other Forms of
Sexual Assaults, "86 and "Mass Graves. "87
The data-base operation was wholly funded by private sources. The total costs,

as of April 30, 1994, exceeded one million dollars. The data-base program and its
contents, the video archive, and all of the original documents were delivered to
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY.

Neither the Commission nor IHRLI verified the information that they received

from the different sources identified above. However, in preparing reports and

the annexes to the Final Report, the staff of IHRLI made an effort to verify the
plausibility of the information, eliminate duplicates and check facts deriving from
multiple sources. This verification process validates the macroanalytical conclusions contained in the reports and annexes. However, each item of information
cannot be advanced as having evidentiary reliability in criminal proceedings, at

least according to common law rules of evidence. But after October 1993, the

Commission became more active in seeking out information and in verifying its
source and content. Thus, the Commission developed certain investigative projects whose purpose was to confirm some of the information received from the
various sources described above.88

On-site investigations. A number of exploratory missions were conducted under
the direction of Commander Fenrick, the Rapporteur for On-Site Investigations.

Several important projects were carried out: (1) an investigation in Sarajevo,
which consisted of a law of war study focusing on a single incident and a pilot rape

investigation; (2) a mass-grave exhumation in United Nations Protected Area

(UNPA) Sector West, Croatia, from which nineteen bodies were exhumed; (3) an
attempt to conduct a mass-grave exhumation at Ovc'ara (Vukovar, UNPA Sector
East, Croatia); (4) a radiological investigation in UNPA Sector West; (5) an investi-

gation of the battle of Dubrovnik concerning the destruction of cultural property

and other aspects of the law of war; and (6) an investigation of the "Medak
Pocket" incident (UNPA Sector South, Croatia).89

The Ovcara (Vukovar) mass-grave exhumation was not completed because of
local political obstacles.90 The Commission learned in November 1992 that a mass

grave contained approximately two hundred bodies of presumably murdered
Croats who were at the Vukovar hospital on November 20-21, 1991, when the

Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and Krajina Serb militias took control of the
hospital and the city. After months of negotiations between representatives of the
Commission and the Serbian political authorities in control of the Krajina area,
the Commission received several written approvals from the highest political authorities to conduct the investigation.91 However, when the team of sixty-five
military engineers, investigators and forensic experts arrived in October 1993, a
local Serbian militia commander informed them that the so-called Republika
Id. at 43-46, paras. 183-94. 8 Id. at 51-55, paras. 216-3 1.

8(1 Id. at 55-60, paras. 232-53. 87 Id. at 61-62, paras. 254-64.
88 Under the direction of Commissioner Greve, the Prijedor project, which started with information
gathered in the data base, produced direct information and evidentiary statements.

89 On the Medak Pocket incident, see Final Report, supra note 40, at 49-51, paras. 210-15.
9( Id. at 62-65, paras. 265-76. The Commission, however, conducted several field investigations at
the site with the aid of experts from Physicians for Human Rights. The team confirmed the existence
of the mass grave and videotaped the site and some of the remains found near the surface. The team
also collected some evidence in the nature of statements and other tangible evidence.

9' Id. at 62-63, paras. 265, 267-69. The Croatian Government cooperated with the Commission on
this investigation, as well as other activities conducted in that state.
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Serb-Krajina ("RSK") parliament had decided to postpone the dig until a political

solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was found.92 After further discussions, in November 1993, the president of the "RSK" agreed in writing to the

exhumation on the condition that an observer be present, to which the Commis-

sion agreed.93 Owing to the winter weather, however, the team could not resume
work until the spring of 1994 (April 10, 1994, was the chosen date), when termination of the Commission prevented the pursuit of this investigation.94 The Commission transferred all documents pertaining to the Ovcara mass grave to the

Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY. The United Nations Protection Forces

(UNPROFOR) have remained in control of the area since October 1993. The site
has thus far remained intact.95 It is expected that the Office of the Prosecutor of

the ICTFY will pursue this investigation.96
Concurrently with the Ovcara (Vukovar) investigation described above, the

Commission conducted a similar one in Pakracka Poljana.97 In March 1993, the
Commission learned of mass graves in this area, which reportedly contained seventeen hundred bodies presumed to be inhabitants of the Serb-Krajina area killed by

Croats.98 Physicians for Human Rights confirmed the possible existence of a mass

grave after a preliminary site survey.99 After extensive exploration, the investigators discovered only nineteen bodies-sixteen male and three female-which

were buried in nine separate graves in the same field."'0 Being a rural area,
Pakracka Poljana did not have proper morgue facilities for post-mortem examinations. Consequently, the bodies were properly reburied in an appropriately iden-

tified area guarded by UNPROFOR until such time as the Office of the Prosecutor

of the ICTFY can conduct post-mortem examinations.'0'
The mass-grave investigations required difficult logistical preparation and organization, as well as significant personnel and financial resources, which were

contributed by a few governments.'02 Mass-grave exhumations are like complex
archaeological expeditions requiring labor-intensive, methodical work. The foren-

sic experts from Physicians for Human Rights used the most current technologi-

cal equipment, such as sophisticated electronic mapping procedures to allow the

team to measure and map precisely the entire grave-site area, artifacts, human
remains, and other objects. In addition, still photography and video cameras

recorded all activity at the grave site, the forensic methods utilized, and the identification of objects found. As in archaeological work, after the area was cleared of

92 Id. at 63-64, paras. 271-73.
:' Id. at 64, para. 275. The Croatian Government was given the same privilege.
9 See text at and note 139 infra.

Final Report, supra note 40, at 65, para. 276. The grave site is protected by soldiers from a
nearby Russian UNPROFOR unit.

96 In view of the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the so-called Serb Republic of
Krajina have not yet recognized the competence of the ICTFY, it is doubtful whether the Krajina Serb
authorities will authorize exhumation by the Office of the Prosecutor.

17 Final Report, supra note 40, at 65-66, paras. 277-84. The cooperation of the Government of
Croatia made this investigation possible.

98 Id. at 65, para. 277. 9 Id., para. 278.
Id. at 65-66, para. 281.

101 Id. at 66, para. 283. The grave site was protected by a unit of UNPROFOR's Jordanian battalion
until July 1994, when Croatia requested that the area be placed under the control of its army,
the H.V.

102 The contributing Governments were Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States. Sixty-five
persons were directly involved in these operations.
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growth and topsoil, small tools and brushes were used to expose the
At all times during the process, precautions were taken to ensure that evidence
was properly preserved and that the remains were kept in a way that would en-

hance preservation."'

Three separate investigative projects were also undertaken under the direction
of three members of the Commission. First, Commissioner Greve conducted a
comprehensive study of the Prijedor area, which resulted in the accumulation of
several hundred pages of testimony from victims and witnesses located in several
counties. The testimony focused on "ethnic cleansing" and other violations of
international humanitarian law in that region of Bosnia.'05 A confidential summary report was delivered to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY shortly
after the Commission officially terminated its work and the project is expected to
produce the bases for some early prosecutorial action. Second, Commissioner

M'Baye conducted an investigation into the destruction of cultural property, focusing on Dubrovnik and the Mostar Bridge.'06 Third, Chairman Bassiouni directed a rape investigation in Croatia.107
The rape investigation was the first of its kind to have been conducted in time
of war. The thirty-five persons involved included thirty-one women from eleven
countries. The all-female team of investigators consisted of experienced prosecu-

tors (and one criminal defense lawyer), with the support of female mental health
specialists (with the exception of two male psychiatrists). The legal investigative
team and the mental health team were all volunteers. The Commission, however,
provided administrative staff and translators. The group was divided into eleven

teams, which operated in five cities contemporaneously and interviewed 223 victims and witnesses. The evidence that they secured took the form of interviewers'

reports, which were submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY.108
The rape investigation was supplemented by other investigations conducted by
certain governments for and on behalf of the Commission. The information ob-

tained by the government-sponsored investigations, together with the information
contained in the data base, formed the bases of the Commission's findings on that
question in its Final Report.'09

The Commission concluded in its Final Report that rape was essentially used by
one of the "warring factions" against another of the "warring factions" in a

systematic way that implied a policy of, at least, omission, if not commission.1l1
Because of the significance of the evidence accumulated by the Commission and
103 For an in-depth report on the exhumations, see Annexes X.A (Ovcara) and X.B (Pakracka
Poljana) to the Commission's Final Report, supra note 40.

104 See special reports pertaining to on-site investigations in the following annexes to the Final
Report, supra note 40: X.A (Vukovar, Ovcara, UNPA Sector East, Croatia); X.B (Medak and Dubrovnik, UNPA Sectors East and West); and XII (radiological investigation, UNPA Sector West, Croatia).
105 Final Report, supra note 40, at 37-43, paras. 151-82. The evidence obtained was turned over to
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY.

X' Id. at 66-68, paras. 285-97.

1"7 See id., Ann. IXA, Sexual Assault Investigation.

08 The Commission, by agreement with the Acting Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt (Australia),
decided not to take formal statements of victims and witnesses in order not to prejudice the Prosecutor's subsequent work and also not to have statements that could be used later to impeach witnesses at
trial. This was not the Commission's only concern. Concern for the victims' and witnesses' safety and

privacy, as well as their emotional state, was paramount. The project was funded by a contribution
from the Netherlands.

See Final Report, supra note 40, at 55-60, paras. 232-53.
Id. at 60, paras. 251-53.
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the large number of victims desirous of testifying, it is expected that the Office of
the Prosecutor will give this particularly heinous crime its utmost attention and

highest priority. But the nature of this crime is such that the Prosecutor will have

to provide effective security measures to protect victims and witnesses, as well as

provide for measures to ensure their privacy."'
Investigations conducted by governments. The Governments of Austria, Germany
and Sweden employed government lawyers and police investigators to conduct
investigations for and on behalf of the Commission. The Austrian investigation

covered over 453 cases involving various aspects of violations of international
humanitarian law. A special investigation in that country dealt with seven rape
cases. In addition, the Government of Austria funded the Boltzman Institute's
investigation of "ethnic cleansing" in Zvornik (Bosnia), for which over five

hundred refugees in Austria were interviewed by the institute's staff."2 The investigation in Germany focused on the Prijedor area and was part of the investigation

on that area conducted by Commissioner Greve.'"3 Sweden conducted 153 police
interviews of victims of violations of international humanitarian law, of whom 34
were rape victims.

By agreement with these Governments, the information they provided was not
entered into the data base at IHRLI, in order to preserve confidentiality and

privacy. However, the information was forwarded by the Commission to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY. Additionally, quite a few governmental submissions to the Commission contained detailed reports and interviews with victims

and witnesses. Among them are reports from the United Kingdom concerning
victims and witnesses from the Prijedor area and, more particularly, former detainees from the Omarska prison camp. The United States presented several

hundred pages of reports and summaries of testimony of victims and witnesses, a
large number of them from the general areas of Brcko and Prijedor. Detailed
submissions were received from the Governments of Bosnia and Hercegovina,

Croatia and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, which also included reports of
violations of international humanitarian law committed against Serbs in Krajina

and eastern and western Slavonia (Croatia), and Serbs in Bosnia.
Field missions conducted by the Commission. The Commission conducted thirty-

five field missions during the period from March 1993 to March 1994. They
included some of the investigations described above, as well as exploratory and

preparatory missions for some of the Commission's projects. The field missions
also included the gathering of evidence and receipt of information from the
"warring factions," various organizations in the respective countries, UNPRO-

FOR," 4 and the European Community Monitoring Mission." 5

"' The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTFY ensure the support and protection of
victims and witnesses.

112 See Final Report, supra note 40, Ann. IV, pt. 3.
11'3 Final Report, supra note 40, at 37-43, paras. 151-82.

114 At first, UNPROFOR did not provide the Commission with information on violations of international humanitarian law on the grounds that it was contrary to its mandate. The Civil Police of

UNPROFOR (CIVPOL) also did not give the Commission detailed reports of its investigations until after
April 1993, when more information was forthcoming, though sketchy. In September 1993, the situation changed and UNPROFOR started to conduct some detailed investigations, particularly on the

Medak Pocket incident, supra note 89, and the Stupni Do incident, which involved the destruction of
a village and the brutal killing of a large number of its inhabitants.

11'5 Regrettably, the European Community Monitoring Mission has never had a centralized documentation center where all of its reports could be kept and cataloged.
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Cooperation with governments, UN bodies, intergovernmental organizations and
nongovernmental organizations. The Commission cooperated with a wide variety

of sources of information, which are mentioned in its two interim reports"6 and
its Final Report."7 This cooperation contributed significantly to the Commission's work. However, notwithstanding Security Council Resolutions 771 and
780, relatively few governments supplied the Commission with information. They
were Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Burkina Faso,
Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab

Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela."8 Of these,
even fewer supplied detailed or legally relevant information. They were Austria,

Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The Commission cooperated most closely with the office of
the Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur on the Former Yugosla-

via, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and the respective staffs of the two bodies were in daily

contact. Cooperation could not have been at a better or more amicable level.

UNPROFOR and its CIVPOL division cooperated with the Commission in the field,
but neither group provided substantive information about violations because of

UNPROFOR's mandate."19
As for intergovernmental organizations, the United Nations High Commis-

sioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross120 did not
give the Commission substantive information. Because such organizations have
specific mandates that, for the most part, do not include gathering or providing
information on violations of international humanitarian law, the Commission did
not have the benefit of acquiring additional and possible corroborative information from them.

Several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), however, provided information and assistance in many respects. For example, they assisted the Commission

during its field missions, such as the investigation of rape and sexual assault of

January-March 1994.121 Particularly, Physicians for Human Rights gave the Commission valuable assistance in connection with the mass-grave investigations.'22
Other NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch Helsinki, were very useful to the
Commission because of the specificity of their reports. These reports were supple-

116 First Interim Report, supra note 44, at 9, paras. 17-21; Second Interim Report of the Commis-

sion of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc. S/26545,
at 8, paras. 20-24 (Oct. 6, 1993) [hereinafter Second Interim Report].
1"7 Final Report, supra note 40, at 9, 10, 12, paras. 18, 25, 37.
118 The information received from the "warring parties" was useful. In many cases, the information

was quite detailed and accompanied by statements of victims and witnesses. The Governments of
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia were particularly cooperative.

19 See text at and note 114 supra. A question arises with respect to UN missions using military
personnel, such as UNPROFOR, whether common Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions, which
requires all parties to enforce the Conventions, includes the duty to report at least "grave breaches"
when military forces are placed under UN command.
120 For a recent commentary on the workings of the International Committee of the Red Cross by a
staff member, see MICHELE MERCIER, CRIMES SANS CH ATIMENT (1994).

121 See Final Report, supra note 40, at 57-60, paras. 241-53. These NGOs identified victims and
witnesses, established contact between them and the Commission and provided them with material
and psychological support.

122 See text at notes 99-103 supra.
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mented by the media.123 The information in the data base derives essentially from
all of these sources.

Reports of the Commission; The Commission issued two interim reports.124 The
first two reports and the work of the Commission were noted in resolutions of the

Security Council, the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, the
office of the Special Rapporteur on the Former Yugoslavia, and other UN bodies.
The Commission also produced a Final Report, which will be supplemented by

twenty-two annexes (numbered I through XII, with subsections).125 The Secretary-General not only expressed his full agreement with the Commission's conclu-

sions in the Final Report, but also supported the publication of the annexes in his

letter of transmittal of the Final Report to the Security Council.'26 Particularly, he
stated that the annexes "as a whole constitute an integral part of the report."1127
The Secretary-General then informed the Security Council that "the Chairman

requested that the annexes be published, although for cost purposes and given
their volume (approximately 3,000 pages), it was suggested that they be published
in English only and funded from the remaining surplus in the Trust Fund of the

Commission of Experts." 128 Thus, it is expected that the United Nations will soon
publish the annexes.

Resources of the Commission. To fulfill its mandate, the resource needs of the
Commission were significant, considering the massive amount of victimization

that occurred over an extensive area in this conflict.'29 Yet the General Assembly,
which is the competent UN body in that regard, did not allocate resources for the
Commission's investigative work or the data base. As a result, the chairman and

members of the Commission had to seek the assistance of governments and volunteers in conducting the investigations, which was a difficult and time-consuming
task. But it was the assistance of certain governments in contributing personnel
and funds that allowed the Commission to carry out its work.

The Commission was also limited in personnel. Only the chairman worked full
time. However, Commissioners Fenrick and Greve and Professor Opsahl devoted

an exceptional amount of their time to the Commission and its work. For the first

few months, the staff consisted of two UN-assigned Secretariat professionals and
one secretary. Later, an additional professional Secretariat person, a secretary

123 See, e.g., Roy GUTMAN, A WITNESS TO GENOCIDE (1993).
24 First Interim Report, supra note 44; Second Interim Report, supra note 116.
125 Final Report, supra note 40. The annexes consist of the following: (I) Rules of Procedure
Commission; (I.A) The Database and Documents Received; (I.B) List of Missions Undertaken by the
Commission; (I.C) List of Non-Governmental Organizations which assisted or collaborated with the
Commission; (II) Rape and Sexual Assault: A Legal Study; (III) Military Structure; (III.A) Special
Forces; (IV) The Policy of "ethnic cleansing"; (V) The Prijedor Report; (VI) Study of the Battle and
Siege of Sarajevo; (VI.A) Sarajevo Investigation; (VII) Medak Investigation; (VIII) Prison Camps; (IX)
Sexual Assault; (IX.A) Sexual Assault Investigation; (X) Mass Graves; (X.A) Vukovar (Ovcara, UNPA
Sector East, Croatia); (X.B) Investigations in UNPA Sectors East and West, Medak and Dubrovnik;

(XI) Destruction of Cultural Property Report; (XI.A) The Battle of Dubrovnik and the Law of Armed
Conflict; and (XII) Radiological Investigation (UNPA Sector West, Croatia).

I2' Final Report, supra note 40, at 2. 127 Id.
128 Id.

'29 Id. at 71, para. 310. The Commission identified in its Final Report 715 prison camps, 187 mass
graves allegedly containing between 5 and 3,000 bodies, and almost 800 rape victims by name or
number. In addition, there were 1,673 unnamed rape victims in the data base. General reports
indicate 200,000-250,000 persons killed, over 50,000 cases of torture and an estimated 20,000 rape

cases. There have also been large-scale destruction of public, private and cultural property; pillaging
and looting; and many other violations of international humanitarian law.
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and an administrative officer were provided. The Commission also enjoyed the
valuable assistance of two seconded professionals, Lt. Col. Anton Kempenaars

(the Netherlands) and Morten Bergsmo (Norway). Judge Jean-Paul Laborde
(France) was seconded to the Commission for the month of April.

In conducting its field investigations, the Commission benefited from support
personnel seconded for specific missions by three Governments: Canada provided
military lawyers and investigators; Norway provided two military lawyers, who
worked on the Dubrovnik investigation; and the Netherlands provided a military
unit of thirty-three combat engineers, including two radiological experts. Among

the combat engineers was a unit of three men specializing in the discovery of
unmarked graves whose experience proved invaluable in the mass-grave investiga-

tion in UNPA Sector West, Croatia."30 Physicians for Human Rights, a U.S.-based
organization, provided several successive teams who worked on the Ovcara (Vukovar) mass grave and the mass-grave exhumation in UNPA Sector West, Croa-

tia. 1 The latter exhumation could not have been undertaken without this

zation's help. All of the contributed personnel costs were covered by their respective governments.

In May 1993, the Secretary-General established a Voluntary Trust Fund to
finance the Commission's investigatory work. The contributions received between

May 1993 and April 1994 totaled $1,320,631.132 As stated above, the balance of
about $230,000 in the fund at the termination date (less some final expenses) was

to be used to publish the annexes to the Commission's report.133
The contributed costs by the United Nations exceeded $1.5 million and consisted mainly of salaries and travel expenses. As of August 31, 1993, the Commis-

sion ceased to have an independent budget and the costs of its personnel and

other administrative expenses were covered by the Office of Legal Affairs. As of
September 1, a portion of these costs had to be assumed by the Voluntary Trust
Fund owing to a lack of resources.

Termination of the Commission. As stated above, the Security Council stated in

Resolution 827 (1993) that the Commission should continue its work "on an
urgent basis" pending the appointment of a prosecutor for the ICTFY.134 The
Commission's (second) Interim Report of October 6, 1993, outlined a work program planned to last until July 31, 1994. This program and its projected concluding date had been communicated to the Secretary-General by the Commission.135
Thus, when the Legal Counsel notified the Commission of its termination, effective April 30, 1994, it was a surprise. Curiously, only two days later, on December
15, 1993, the General Assembly not only commended the Commission for its
work, but supported its continuation, stating that it " [e]ncourages the Commission
of Experts, in cooperation with the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal on
the former Yugoslavia, to facilitate the work of the International Tribunal, including the establishment of a record of violations such as ethnic cleansing and system-

atic rape."''36 However, nothing ever came of this decision.
130 Id. at 65-66, paras. 277-84. See text at notes 100-01 supra.
3' See Final Report, supra note 40, at 65-66, paras. 277-84.
332 For a list of participating countries and the amounts contributed, see id. at 12, para. 35.
33 See text at note 128 supra. 134 See text followying note 53 supra.

135 On August 29, 1993, the Commission submitted a nonpaper to the Secretar
included a termination date of July 31, 1994. Furthermore, the Second Interim Report, supra note
116, reflected a plan of action based on that date.

136 UN Doc. A/48/L.50 (1993) (with 109 states voting in favor). Interestingly, the Governments of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wanted the Commission to
continue its Work. Croatia even sent a formal letter to the Security Council.
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The Commission deemed the termination date of April 30, 1994, to be prema-

ture, in light of the anticipated date of July 31.137 This earlier termination curtailed some investigations, particularly that of rape and sexual assault, which

needed to be continued for two months.138 The early termination also caused the

cancellation of mass-grave exhumations in Ovcara139 and Marino Selo (UNPA
Sector West, Croatia), and the identification of the nineteen bodies discovered in

the mass grave at Pakracka Poljana,140 all of which had been planned to start on
April 10.
In addition, the premature end of the Commission did not permit the type of
transition between the Commission and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTFY
that would have made it possible to transfer the Commission's experience and

data base to the Prosecutor with a minimal loss of time.141 In early March 1994,
the Office of Legal Affairs requested that the Commission conduct the transfer,

which was complete by the time the Commission submitted the Final Report to

the Secretary-General.142

CONCLUSION

The work of the Commission of Experts is unique in the history of the United
Nations and its accomplishments bring credit to the Organization. Perhaps be-

cause of its uniqueness, the Commission's beginnings were difficult. In time, some
of the difficulties were overcome. It is a tribute to the commitment, diligence and

ingenuity of the members, staff and others who assisted the Commission in its
work that so much was done with so little in such a limited amount of time.
Although politics is always a factor in the work of such bodies, there was no
direct political interference in the Commission's work. However, the lack of re-

sources and bureaucratic difficulties, which are part of UN organizational life, led
to delays and frustrations. Some saw in these delays and difficulties the hidden
hand of a political agenda designed to cripple or slow the Commission's work.

Others, more familiar with United Nations realities, shrugged off such speculation. But, as with so many things in life, the truth probably lies somewhere in
between.

Once the Tribunal was established, there was unnecessary uncertainty about the
role and future of the Commission and its relationship to the Tribunal. Three

137 The Commission notified the Secretary-General of its views concerning the premature term
tion and its consequences. However, it appeared that several members of the Security Council, particularly permanent members including the United States, favored earlier termination.

138 The rape and sexual assault investigation continued until the last possible moment, March 31,
1994. However, there were an estimated 200 more victims in Croatia from Bosnia and Hercegovina as

well as Croatia to be interviewed, 7 victims from Serbia to be interviewed in Belgrade, and an undetermined number of victims to be interviewed in Turkey at the request of the Turkish Government. The

chairman urged the respective Governments to conduct them and to send the findings to the Office of
the Prosecutor of the ICTFY, but thus far there appears to have been no follow-up on this suggestion,

perhaps because these Governments may not have wanted to assume the task in the absence of the
Commission.

'39 Final Report, supra note 40, at 62-65, paras. 265-76.
4 Id. at 65-66, paras. 277-84.

'4' As Ambassador Rick Endiforth once told me, a proper transition should have been "like a relay
race where the two runners run side by side while one passes the baton to the other." However, after
the appointment of Justice Goldstone, close cooperation was promptly established.

142 Final Report, supra note 40, at 12, para. 33.
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options existed: (1) the Commission could continue to work until a certain date
(that date was indeed established by the Commission as July 31, 1994); (2) it could
be folded into the Tribunal's framework and become the investigatory arm of the
Prosecutor; or (3) it could receive a new mandate, whereby it would focus on the
larger picture and on policies and patterns of violations of international humani-

tarian law.143
The significance of an eventual new and broader mandate for the Commission
is obvious, as the Prosecutor must necessarily focus on specific cases. Consequently, there is a need for continuing to investigate such policies and practices as

"ethnic cleansing," 144 "systematic rape," 145 the use of "special forces, "146 and
other questions of law and facts pertaining to issues of genocide147 and crimes
against humanity.148 None of these options, however, seem to have been found
acceptable by some permanent members of the Security Council. Some of them
felt that the continuation of the Commission might interfere with the work of the
Prosecutor of the ICTFY, which would be a valid consideration if the new mandate
were not carefully defined and judiciously carried out. Because this option was
not accepted, the larger picture may regrettably be lost. Such a loss will be particularly tragic if the ICTFY is able to prosecute only a limited number of cases, which

may not necessarily include senior commanders and political decision makers.
The Commission's establishment is, however, an important precedent that was
already relied upon in the establishment of a similar commission for Rwanda on

July 1, 1994. 149 As such, its experience and work will be significant to future UN
work and the pursuit of international justice. Ultimately, permanent institutions

of international justice are needed.150
The International Law Commission has been working since 1947 on a Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind'51 and a statute for an

143 Professor Herman Schwartz, among others, publicly advocated a "truth commission." There is
much merit to this suggestion. See Herman Schwartz, What Can We Do about Balkan Atrocities?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 1993, at A27. The truth, however much of it can be objectively discovered and stated,
is only one component. Two additional ones must follow: justice in the declarative and retributive
senses and compensation of victims. On the justice component, see Diane Orentlicher, Settling Ac-

counts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
For the victim-compensation component, see United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Jus-

tice for Victims of Crimes and Abuse of Power, GA Res. 40/34 (Dec. 11, 1985), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF VICTIMS (Nouvelles Etudes Penales No. 7, M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) and
the commentaries on the declaration contained therein. Several governments had suggested including
provisions on victim compensation in the Tribunal's statute, but some members of the Security Council opposed it. Resolution 827 at least provides that "the work of the International Tribunal shall be
carried out without prejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, compen-

sation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian law." SC Res. 827,
supra note 9, operative para. 7.
44 See Final Report, supra note 40, at 33-37, paras. 129-50.

'45 Id. at 55-60,. paras. 232-53. 1'4; Id. at 29-33, paras. 110-28.
141 Id. at 24-27, paras. 87-101. 148 Id. at 20-24, paras. 72-86.
149 SC Res. 775 (July 1, 1994). However, no contacts were established between the Rwanda Commission and members of the Commission of Experts. Thus, the opportunity to transfer valuable
knowledge and experience was lost.

5" See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Enforcing Human Rights through International Criminal Law
and through an International Criminal Tribunal, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT

CENTURY 347 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).

'5' See, e.g., Tenth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/442 (1992); COMMENTARIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S 1991
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international criminal tribunal.152 The experiences of the Commission and the
ICTFY will certainly prove relevant to these efforts. They will be among the bases
relied upon by governments and world public opinion to judge the merits of

establishing a permanent international criminal justice system. Just as Nuremberg

and Tokyo are judged by their historical legacy,'53 so will the Commission and the
ICTFY be judged. But, above all, we must establish truth and try to provide justice.

The parties to the conflict expect it, particularly the victims and witnesses. 154
Impunity cannot be the reward of those who plan, order or commit such international crimes.

As one who has seen and heard so many terrible accounts of atrocities, I must
bear witness to such events. We cannot fail at the very least to bring truth to light.
That is why the premature ending of the Commission was, in my judgment, a

mistake, for it is unlikely that any other body will pursue the overall investigations
that the Commission undertook. Lord Wright, chairman of the UNWCC, stated
the following in 1948:

Over the whole earth there seems to hang a black storm cloud of war under
which the nations cower. If the storm breaks and the waves of war beat
against the lands, the power of law is not likely to sweep back the ocean, but
the atrociousness of the tempest may be weakened in some degree by the
effect of the lessons and rules derived from the last war. Even in the fury of
the passions the small still voice of justice and of conscience may, however
faintly, be heard, if prudence and humanity are of no avail even in this
boasted age of civilisation. Must we again recur to the days of Attila or

Genghis Khan or Tamerlane?'55
The challenge to a new world order remains to be met, but justice is its founda-

tion. Indeed, without justice, there can be no lasting peace in this or any other
conflict. To paraphrase George Santayana: are we condemned to repeat our mistakes because we refuse or are unable to learn from the lessons of the past?
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*

DRAFr CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND (Nouvelles Etudes Penales

No. 11, M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1993).

152 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, UN Doc.
A/49/10 (1994); Revised Report of the Working Group on the Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.490 & Add.1 (1993); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

(1987); BASSIOUNI, supra note 46.
153 In his final report on Nuremberg, Justice Jackson stated that he was "consoled by the fact that in
proceedings of this novelty, errors and missteps may also be instructive to the future." See JACKSON

REPORT, supra note 25, at 440. See also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years After, 18 CASE

W. RES. J. INT'L L. 261 (1986); Forty Years After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the
War Crimes Trials on International and National Law, in 80 ASIL PROC. 56 (1986) (panel and
discussion).

54 Final Report, supra note 40, at 72, para. 320.
155 HISTORY OF UNWCC, supra note 19, at iv.
* Former Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of

Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia; Professor of Law, President, International

Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University. The views expressed herein are those of the author
and do not represent the views of the Commission of Experts or the United Nations. The assistance of

Carolyn Durnik is gratefully acknowledged.

This content downloaded from 140.192.110.229 on Mon, 06 Nov 2017 21:11:17 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

